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In the past 20 years, start-ups have emerged as the major drivers towards fueling 
another space race era, further advancing the space industry. One of the key players that 
assisted this movement is the Google Lunar XPRIZE (GLXP), which is an international 
competition of 16 teams around the globe. The challenge is to land on the Moon, to travel 
over 500 meters, and to send high definition video and images back to the Earth by the end 
of 2017. Among the competitors, team HAKUTO is the sole Japanese team, and we are at 
the final stage of rover development (as of the timing we had radiation test at Cyclotron 
Center)1). Our rover needs to survive the extreme space environment, and the qualification 
of the avionics is required to confirm that the mission is feasible. Since the 1960s, 
space-grade electronics have been tailored based on military standards or the techniques 
nurtured during the space race2). Owing to strict guidelines and testing protocols, 
customized parts were generally associated with a high development cost while the 
state-of-the-art technologies of that time were not implemented to reduce potential failure. 
With the selection being scarce, transitioning to readily available yet affordable commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware was not a difficult choice. This trend enabled flexibility 
when choosing high performance power efficient platforms, replacing the obsolete devices 
for space applications. These products, however, still present challenges; many of the 
COTS components do not qualify for the successful operation under harsh space conditions. 
To verify their performance, intensive testing and inspection are conducted to ensure their 
reliability under such conditions. As a start of radiation assurance, the total ionization dose 
(TID) test is typically conducted using radioactive isotopes such as Co-60 or Cs-137 to 
determine whether the parts meet the desired confidence level for space operation3). The 
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test enables the review of the COTS hardware degradation by accumulating a large amount 
of radiation in a short period of time, typically exposing it to a much higher dosage level 
beyond the mission requirement. Another aspect that needs to be considered is the single 
event effect (SEE) on the hardware to assess any probabilistic errors by high-energy 
bombardment4). Using these experiments for the preflight assessment review, COTS 
devices are certified as near flight-ready with an adequate reliability based on the terrestrial 
stage analysis. This test will focus on the SEE on an electronic device using a proton beam: 
a near representation of solar energetic particles. 
 
Evaluation Methodology  
During the testing phase, we defined several potential hazardous points the devices 
might experience during bombardment. Table 1 presents a list of potential failure modes 
during the experiment: SEU, single event functional interrupt (SEFI), and SEL. We 
represented the potential threat cases as a circle and not applicable as a cross, depending on 
the power mode of the electronics and the region of interest during the experiment. 
Furthermore, for each device, we investigated the functionalities that we would like to 
confirm (i.e., checking the serial outputs, read/write on RAM, analog-to-digital conversion 
(ADC) function, power consumption, communication status, and taking of images). In most 
cases, we monitored the device power supply current as a highest priority to determine the 
probability of SEL during equivalent mission dosages of radiation. Other potential 
breakdowns caused by the SEE, such as a single event gate rupture and a single event 
burnout, were not considered in this test as galactic energies are on the order of 1 GeV. 
 
Results 
The test results from the CYRIC radiation facility are shown in Table 2. Of the five 
tested electronics, the IC from the motor controller experienced SEL twice at 2350 and 
3300 seconds. With the power reboot, the motor controller recovered back to its operational 
state both times without any increase in power consumption. Additionally, SEFI occurred 
once on the radio interface board at 1834 seconds, and the ADC value was not received via 
any serial output. Since the watchdog timer was not initiated, we concluded that the 
problem came from an abnormality in the serial function. We confirmed that the device 
could recover from the SEE by power reset, and an increase in power consumption was not 
observed. The other three devices did not experience any SEE throughout the test. Because 
of a high fluence rate at the CYRIC facility, the five tested devices were exposed beyond 
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the expected two days worth of the mission time frame on the Moon. In fact, all of them 
were irradiated enough for the rover to stay at least two lunar cycles. The few SEE 
instances justified the probability that a component malfunction by radiation is low, while 
each component is recoverable. Thus, we conclude that the device is radiation tolerable.  
 
Conclusion 
The COTS devices tested in this study demonstrated that the system can be 
recovered from the proton-induced SEE. Although one of the devices experienced an 
increase in power consumption due to SEFI, each powered hardware was able to recover 
using power rebooting. For future work, further SEE experiments on a fully integrated 
system should be conducted to verify any failures when several components are relaying on 
complex commands to various hardware. Moreover, we need to confirm the SEE 
occurrence based on the LET spectrum for the lunar surface conditions (by using heavy 
ions as radiation source). Future missions will most likely require the operation of the 
device for a longer time duration, and therefore, extensive testing will be required for 
further qualifications. This result has been published as journal paper5). 
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Table 1.  Potential Failure Mode Watch List for Each Device 
 
 





Figure 1.  Test Configuration at Cyclotron Facility. 
 
